STF(4) BSD Programmer's Manual STF(4)NAMEstf - 6to4 tunnel interface
SYNOPSIS
pseudo-device stfDESCRIPTION
The stf interface supports ``6to4'' IPv6 in IPv4 encapsulation. It can
tunnel IPv6 traffic over IPv4, as specified in draft-ietf-
ngtrans-6to4-06.txt.
For ordinary nodes in 6to4 site, you do not need stf interface. The stf
interface is necessary for site border router (called ``6to4 router'' in
the specification).
Due to the way 6to4 protocol is specified, stf interface requires certain
configuration to work properly. Single (no more than 1) valid 6to4 ad-
dress needs to be configured to the interface. ``A valid 6to4 address''
is an address which has the following properties. If any of the follow-
ing properties are not satisfied, stf raises runtime error on packet
transmission. Read the specification for more details.
o matches 2002:xxyy:zzuu::/48 where xxyy:zzuu is a hexadecimal notation
of an IPv4 address for the node. IPv4 address can be taken from any
of interfaces your node has. Since the specification forbids the use
of IPv4 private address, the address needs to be a global IPv4 ad-
dress.
o Subnet identifier portion (48th to 63rd bit) and interface identifier
portion (lower 64 bits) are properly filled to avoid address colli-
sions.
If you would like the node to behave as a relay router, the prefix length
for the IPv6 interface address needs to be 16 so that the node would con-
sider any 6to4 destination as ``on-link''. If you would like to restrict
6to4 peers to be inside certain IPv4 prefix, you may want to configure
IPv6 prefix length as ``16 + IPv4 prefix length''. stf interface will
check the IPv4 source address on packets, if the IPv6 prefix length is
larger than 16.
stf can be configured to be ECN friendly. This can be configured by
IFF_LINK1. See gif(4) for details.
Please note that 6to4 specification is written as ``accept tunnelled
packet from everyone'' tunnelling device. By enabling stf device, you
are making it much easier for malicious parties to inject fabricated IPv6
packet to your node. Also, malicious party can inject an IPv6 packet
with fabricated source address to make your node generate improper tun-
nelled packet. Administrators must take caution when enabling the inter-
face. To prevent possible attacks, stf interface filters out the follow-
ing packets. Note that the checks are no way complete:
o Packets with IPv4 unspecified addrss as outer IPv4 source/destination
(0.0.0.0/8)
o Packets with loopback address as outer IPv4 source/destination
(127.0.0.0/8)
o Packets with IPv4 multicast address as outer IPv4 source/destination
(224.0.0.0/4)
o Packets with limited broadcast address as outer IPv4 source/destina-
tion (255.0.0.0/8)
o Packets with subnet broadcast address as outer IPv4 source/destina-
tion. The check is made against subnet broadcast addresses for all
of the directly connected subnets.
o Packets that does not pass ingress filtering. Outer IPv4 source ad-
dress must meet the IPv4 topology on the routing table. Ingress fil-
ter can be turned off by IFF_LINK2 bit.
o The same set of rules are appplied against the IPv4 address embedded
into inner IPv6 address, if the IPv6 address matches 6to4 prefix.
It is recommended to filter/audit incoming IPv4 packet with IP protocol
number 41, as necessary. It is also recommended to filter/audit encapsu-
lated IPv6 packets as well. You may also want to run normal ingress fil-
ter against inner IPv6 address to avoid spoofing.
EXAMPLES
Note that 8504:0506 is equal to 133.4.5.6, written in hexadecimals.
# ifconfig ne0 inet 133.4.5.6 netmask 0xffffff00
# ifconfig stf0 inet6 2002:8504:0506:0000:a00:5aff:fe38:6f86 \
prefixlen 16 alias
The following configuration accepts packets from IPv4 source 9.1.0.0/16
only. It emits 6to4 packet only for IPv6 destination 2002:0901::/32
(IPv4 destination will match 9.1.0.0/16).
# ifconfig ne0 inet 9.1.2.3 netmask 0xffff0000
# ifconfig stf0 inet6 2002:0901:0203:0000:a00:5aff:fe38:6f86 \
prefixlen 32 alias
SEE ALSOgif(4), inet(4), inet6(4)
http://www.6bone.net/6bone_6to4.html
Brian Carpenter, and Keith Moore, Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4
Clouds, RFC, 3056, February 2001.
Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino, Possible abuse against IPv6 transition
technologies, draft-itojun-ipv6-transition-abuse-01.txt, July 2000, work
in progress.
HISTORY
The stf device first appeared in WIDE/KAME IPv6 stack.
BUGS
No more than one stf interface is allowed for a node, and no more than
one IPv6 interface address is allowed for an stf interface. It is to
avoid source address selection conflicts between IPv6 layer and IPv4
layer, and to cope with ingress filtering rule on the other side. This
is a feature to make stf work right for all occasions.
KAME March 6, 2000 2
