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privileges(5)							 privileges(5)

NAME
       privileges - description of HP-UX privileges

DESCRIPTION
       The  operating system has traditionally used an "all or nothing" privi‐
       lege model, where root users (those with effective  such	 as  the  user
       named  have  virtually  unlimited power, and other users have few or no
       special privileges.

       System administrators often need to delegate limited  powers  to	 other
       users.	HP-UX  provides several ways to do this.  Because these mecha‐
       nisms permit users other than root users to perform certain  privileged
       operations,  HP-UX  documentation  often uses terms such as "privileged
       user" or "user who has appropriate privileges" instead of  "root	 user"
       when describing who is permitted to perform an operation.

       In  the absence of a more specific description of the privileges neces‐
       sary to perform an operation (typically available in the man  page  for
       that  operation), you can generally assume that root users are suitably
       privileged.

   Legacy Delegation Methods
       HP-UX has used several methods of delegating limited powers,  including
       restricted  the	privilege  groups  described  in  privgrp(5), the file
       described in shutdown(1M), and the file described in crontab(1).

   Fine-Grained Privileges
       The HP-UX fine-grained privilege model splits the powers of root	 users
       into  a	set  of privileges.  Each privilege grants a process that pos‐
       sesses that privilege the right to a certain set of restricted services
       provided	 by  the  kernel.   Privileges	can be managed internally by a
       process with "privilege bracketing".  Privilege bracketing is the prac‐
       tice of enabling, or "raising", a privilege only while the privilege is
       needed, then disabling, or "lowering", the privilege.   The  privileges
       that  a	process	 has raised determine which sensitive system call ser‐
       vices the process can invoke.

   Legacy Privileges
       Legacy privileges are those  privileges	originally  defined  in	 priv‐
       grp(5).	 All of the privileges from that set except have been incorpo‐
       rated into fine-grained privileges:

       PRIV_CHOWN	    PRIV_FSSTHREAD     PRIV_LOCKRDONLY	PRIV_MLOCK
       PRIV_MPCTL	    PRIV_PSET	       PRIV_RTPRIO	PRIV_RTSCHED
       PRIV_SERIALIZE	    PRIV_SPUCTL

   Basic Privileges
       Basic privileges are granted by default to all  processes.   The	 basic
       privileges are the set of the following:

       PRIV_EXEC	    PRIV_FORK	       PRIV_LINKANY	PRIV_SESSION

   Root Replacement Privileges
       Root  replacement privileges are the privileges that provide the powers
       associated with a process that has an effective user ID of  zero.   The
       root replacement privileges are the following:

       PRIV_ACCOUNTING	    PRIV_AUDCONTROL    PRIV_CHOWN	PRIV_CHROOT
       PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT	    PRIV_DACREAD       PRIV_DACWRITE	PRIV_DEVOPS
       PRIV_DLKM	    PRIV_FSINTEGRITY   PRIV_FSS		PRIV_FSSTHREAD
       PRIV_LIMIT	    PRIV_LOCKRDONLY    PRIV_MKNOD	PRIV_MLOCK
       PRIV_MOUNT	    PRIV_MPCTL	       PRIV_NETADMIN	PRIV_NETPRIVPORT
       PRIV_NETPROMISCUOUS  PRIV_NETRAWACCESS  PRIV_OBJSUID	PRIV_OWNER
       PRIV_PSET	    PRIV_REBOOT	       PRIV_RTPRIO	PRIV_RTSCHED
       PRIV_RTPSET	    PRIV_SELFAUDIT     PRIV_SERIALIZE	PRIV_SPUCTL
       PRIV_SYSATTR	    PRIV_SYSNFS

       These  privileges  are granted by default to any process with an effec‐
       tive user ID of zero.

       If the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02 or  later)  is
       installed  on  the system, the and privileges are each divided into two
       privileges. By using the new privileges, a process can now allow a sub‐
       set of the operations while disallowing the other.

       The privilege is divided into and The privilege is divided into and The
       privilege is divided into and

       To maintain backward compatibility, each string representation  of  and
       becomes	a compound privilege.  The numeric representation is redefined
       to one of the new privileges, which now provides only a subset  of  the
       capabilities that the compound privileges used to offer.

       For  example,  if the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02
       or later) is not installed on the system, the privilege is required  to
       call functions and Therefore, a process that has the privilege can call
       both  functions.	  If  the  HP-UX  ContainmentPlus   product   (version
       B.11.31.02 or later) is installed on the system, the compound privilege
       is divided into two privileges: and The privilege is required  to  call
       the  function  while  the  privilege  is required to call the function.
       Therefore, if the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02  or
       later) is installed on the system, a process that has the privilege can
       call the function but cannot call the function.	At the same  time,  if
       the  HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02 or later) is not
       installed on the system, the numeric representation for	the  privilege
       is  60.	 If  the  HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02 or
       later) is installed on the system, the numeric representation  for  the
       privilege  is  also 60. Although they have the same numeric representa‐
       tion, the new privilege only offers a subset of the  capabilities  (for
       example, call than what used to offer (for example, call and

   Policy Override Privileges
       Policy  override privileges override compartment rules.	There are four
       policy override privileges:

       PRIV_CHANGECMPT	    PRIV_CMPTREAD      PRIV_CMPTWRITE	PRIV_COMMALLOWED.

       These privileges are not granted by default to processes with an effec‐
       tive user ID of zero.  These privileges only apply to compartments fea‐
       ture (see compartments(5) and cmpt_tune(1M) to determine if  this  fea‐
       ture  is enabled).  These privileges comprise part of the set of privi‐
       leges in the compound privilege

   Policy Configuration Privileges
       Policy configuration privileges control how privileges are  configured.
       There  are two such privileges, and These privileges are not granted by
       default to processes with an effective user ID of zero.	 These	privi‐
       leges comprise part of the set of privileges in the compound privilege

   Process Attribute Privileges
       Process attribute privileges are privileges only in the sense that they
       are manipulated like other privileges.  is the only member of this set.
       This privilege is not granted by default to processes with an effective
       user ID of zero.

   Compound Privileges
       Compound privileges are a shorthand way of specifying a predefined  set
       of simple privileges.  These compound privileges are subject to redefi‐
       nition in future releases to allow for the creation of new  privileges.
       The compound privileges are defined as follows:

	      Refers to the Basic Privileges.

	      Refers  to  the  union  of Basic Privileges and Root Replacement
	      Privileges.

	      Refers to the Policy Override Privileges and the Policy
			     Configuration Privileges.

       If the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version B.11.31.02 or  later)  is
       installed  on  the  system,  and becomes compound privileges defined as
       follows:

	      Refers to the union of the  privilege  controlling  core	system
	      attributes
			     and   the	 privilege   controlling  host-related
			     attributes.

	      Refers to the union of the privilege controlling file system
			     mounting/unmounting and the privilege controlling
			     swap space.

	      Refers to the union of the privilege controlling devices
			     and pseudo terminals.

   Privilege Descriptions
       The following list specifies privilege names and their primary purpose.

	      Allows a process to control the process accounting system (see
		     acct(2)).

	      Allows a process to start, modify, and stop the auditing system.

	      Grants a process the ability to change its compartment.
		     (See  compartments(5)  and	 cmpt_tune(1M) to determine if
		     this extended feature is enabled.)

	      Allows a process to grant privileges to binaries.

	      Allows access to the
		     system calls (see chown(2)).

	      Allows a process to change its root directory.

	      Allows a process to change it UIDs, GIDs, and group lists.
		     Also allows a process to a file and  leave	 the  suid  or
		     sgid bits set on the file, if present.

	      Allows  a	 process to open a file or directory for reading, exe‐
	      cuting
		     (in the case of a file), or searching (in the case	 of  a
		     directory), bypassing compartment rules that would other‐
		     wise not permit the operation.  (See compartments(5)  and
		     cmpt_tune(1M)  to	determine  if this extended feature is
		     enabled.)

	      Allows a process to write into a file or directory,
		     bypassing compartment rules that would otherwise not per‐
		     mit    the	   operation.	  (See	 compartments(5)   and
		     cmpt_tune(1M) to determine if this	 extended  feature  is
		     enabled.)

	      Allows  a	 process  to override compartment rules in the IPC and
	      networking
		     subsystems.  (See compartments(5)	and  cmpt_tune(1M)  to
		     determine if this extended feature is enabled.)

	      Enables a process to manage system attributes including the
		     setting of tunables, and modifying user quotas.

		     This  privilege is valid only when the HP-UX Containment‐
		     Plus product (version B.11.31.02 or later)	 is  installed
		     on the system.

	      Allows  the process to override all discretionary read, execute,
	      and
		     search access restrictions.  See for more information.

	      Allows the process to override all  discretionary	 write	access
	      restrictions.
		     See for more information.

	      Allows  the  process to do device specific administrative opera‐
	      tions, such as
		     tape or disk formatting.

		     If the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version  B.11.31.02
		     or	 later) is installed on the system, becomes a compound
		     privilege, which includes and

	      Allows a process to load a kernel module (see
		     modload(2)), get information about a loaded kernel module
		     (see  modstat(2)),	 and change the global search path for
		     dynamically loadable kernel modules (see modpath(2)).

	      Allows a process to call
		     (see exec(2)) family calls.

	      Allows a process to create additional processes (using
		     and

	      Allows a process to perform disk operations such as removing  or
	      modifying the
		     size  or  boundaries of disk partitions, or to import and
		     export an LVM volume group across the system.

	      Allows a process to mount and unmount a file system using the
		     and system calls.	See mount(2) and umount(2).

		     This privilege is valid only when the HP-UX  Containment‐
		     Plus  product  (version B.11.31.02 or later) is installed
		     on the system.

	      Reserved.

	      Reserved.

	      Enables a process to modify the host name and domain name.

		     This privilege is valid only when the HP-UX  Containment‐
		     Plus  product  (version B.11.31.02 or later) is installed
		     on the system.

	      Allows a process to set resource and priority limits beyond  the
	      maximum
		     limit values (see setrlimit(2) or nice(2)).

	      Reserved.

	      Permits the use of the
		     system  call  for setting locks on files open for reading
		     only (see lockf(2)).

	      Allows a process to create  character  or	 block	special	 files
	      using the
		     system call (see mknod(2)).

	      Allows access to the
		     system call (see plock(2)).

	      Allows  a	 process  to  control swap space, mount, and unmount a
	      file system using the
		     and system calls.	See mount(2) and umount(2).

		     If the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version  B.11.31.02
		     or	 later) is installed on the system, becomes a compound
		     privilege, which includes and

	      Permits the use of the
		     system call  for  changing	 processor  binding,  locality
		     domain  binding  or  launch  policy  of  a	 process  (see
		     mpctl(2)).

	      Allows a process to perform  network  administrative  operations
	      including
		     configuring  the  network	routing	 tables	 and  querying
		     interface information.

	      Allows a process to bind to a privileged port.
		     By default, port numbers are privileged ports.

	      Enables a process to configure an interface to listen in
		     promiscuous mode.

	      Allows a process to access the raw internet network protocols.

	      Allows a process to set the suid or sgid bits  on	 any  file  if
	      they also
		     have  the	privilege.   Additionally, allows a process to
		     change the ownership of a file without clearing the  suid
		     or	 sgid  bits,  provided	that the process is allowed to
		     change the ownership of the file.

	      Allows a process to override all restrictions  with  respect  to
	      UID matching
		     the owner of the file or resource.	 See for more informa‐
		     tion.

	      Allows change to the system pset configuration
		     (see pset_create(2)).

	      Allows the process to do administrative operations that are pse‐
	      duo terminal specific.

		     This  privilege is valid only when the HP-UX Containment‐
		     Plus product (version B.11.31.02 or later)	 is  installed
		     on the system.

	      Allows  the  process to do device administrative operations that
	      are non-pseudo terminal specific.

		     This privilege is valid only when the HP-UX  Containment‐
		     Plus  product  (version B.11.31.02 or later) is installed
		     on the system.

	      Allows a process to perform reboot operations.

	      Allows access to the
		     system call (see rtprio(2)).

	      Allows a process to control RTE psets
		     (see __pset_rtctl(2)).

	      Allows access to the
		     and to set POSIX.4 real-time priorities (see rtsched(2)).

	      Allows a process to add and modify compartment rules on the sys‐
	      tem.
		     (See  compartments(5)  and	 cmpt_tune(1M) to determine if
		     this extended feature is enabled.)

	      Allows a process to generate auditing records for	 itself	 using
	      the
		     system call (see audwrite(2)).

	      Allows a process to manage swap space using the
		     system call (see swapctl(2)).

		     This  privilege is valid only when the HP-UX Containment‐
		     Plus product (version B.11.31.02 or later)	 is  installed
		     on the system.

	      Permits the use of
		     for forcing the target process to run serially with other
		     processes that are also marked by this system  call  (see
		     serialize(2)).

	      Permits creation of a new session (see
		     setsid(2)), and setpgrp(2)).

	      Permits certain administrative operations in the
		     Instant  Capacity	product for deactivation and reactiva‐
		     tion of processors.  See the Instant Capacity  documenta‐
		     tion for more information.

	      Enables a process to manage system attributes including the
		     setting  of tunables, and modifying the host name, domain
		     name, and user quotas.

		     If the HP-UX ContainmentPlus product (version  B.11.31.02
		     or	 later)	 is  installed	on  the	 system,  PRIV_SYSATTR
		     becomes a compound privilege, which includes and

	      Allows a process to perform NFS operations like exporting a file
	      system, the
		     system  call  (see	 getfh(2)), NFS file locking, revoking
		     NFS authentication, and creating  an  NFS	kernel	daemon
		     thread.

	      Allows a process to log trial mode information to the
		     file.  See below.

   Programming with Privileges
       When  programming with privileges, the name associated with each privi‐
       lege is the same as the name presented here with	 the  string  prefixed
       (that  is,  use the symbolic constant in the source code).  In commands
       associated with privileges, the names  are  used	 without  the  prefix,
       although most commands may also recognize the names with the prefix.

       The  compound privileges and are designed to ease development of appli‐
       cations that retain their  functionality	 even  though  the  underlying
       privileges  changes.   An application that requires compatibility--even
       when the underlying set of privileges changes--ought to ensure that  it
       does  not accidentally drop a new privilege that was added since it was
       developed.  For example, this can be done by dropping  specific	privi‐
       leges  from the effective set using (see priv_remove(3)) or by ensuring
       that  the  compound  privileges	are   used   as	  argument   to	  (see
       priv_set_effective(3)).

   Associating Privileges with Binaries
       Applications  that  depend  on the use of privileges must be registered
       using the command (see setfilexsec(1M)).	 For an	 alternate  method  of
       granting privileges, see privrun(1M)).

       Depending on what kind of restricted tasks an application performs, the
       application can raise the corresponding privilege needed	 before	 doing
       the  task and then lower the privilege after completing the task.  This
       practice is called privilege bracketing.	  It  is  recommended  that  a
       process run with the smallest possible privilege set at any given time.

   Associating Privileges with Processes
       Each  process  has three privilege sets associated with it.  These sets
       are as follows:

	      The maximum set of privileges that a process can raise.
		     The process can remove any privilege from this  set,  but
		     cannot  add a privilege to this set.  The privileges from
		     this set can be added to the effective privilege  set  of
		     the  process.   This set is also often referred to as the
		     Potential Privilege Set.

	      The set of privileges that are currently active for the process.
		     A process can modify this set to keep only the  necessary
		     privileges	 in this set at any given time.	 Any privilege
		     in this set can be removed, but only  privileges  in  the
		     process'	permitted  privilege  set  can	be  added.   A
		     process' Effective Privilege Set is always	 a  subset  of
		     its Permitted Privilege Set.

	      The set of privileges retained when a process calls
		     (see  execve(2)).	 The  process can remove any privilege
		     from this set, but cannot add any privilege to this  set.
		     A	process'  Retained Privilege Set is always a subset of
		     the Permitted Privilege Set.

       These sets can be managed using library calls  specified	 in  functions
       and (See priv_add_effective(3), priv_remove(3), and priv_get(3)).

   Discretionary Restrictions
       Discretionary  restrictions  are the restrictions imposed by the tradi‐
       tional file mode access permissions.  Thus, the	privileges  and	 allow
       read, search, execute, and write operations to proceed even if the file
       mode permissions forbid it.  The privilege allows a process that is not
       the  owner of a file or directory to remove the file or directory whose
       parent directory has the sticky bit set.	 The privilege also  allows  a
       process	that  is  not the owner of a System V IPC message queue, sema‐
       phore set, or shared memory segment, to remove, change ownership of, or
       change permission bits for that object.

   Trial Mode
       This  is a facility provided by the system to aid in reporting the list
       of privileges that a process has used during its lifetime.  A developer
       can  use this feature to verify what privileges an application needs to
       operate.	 When a process with this privilege attempts to use any privi‐
       lege  (by  making  a system call that uses that privilege), an entry is
       logged to which, when taken together, is a list of privileges used.

   Compatibility
       A process with an effective user ID of zero is, by default, treated  as
       possessing  root replacement privileges.	 The compartmentalization fea‐
       ture may further restrict this interpretation of effective user ID such
       that the process is treated as though it has only a specified subset of
       root replacement privileges.  For more details, see the description  of
       "Process Limitation Rules" in compartments(4).

       More  formally, a process is said to observe a privilege if and only if
       one or more of the following conditions hold:

	      ·	 The privilege is present in its effective privilege set, or

	      ·	 The privilege is a root replacement privilege, effective  uid
		 of  the  process  is  zero,  and  compartmentalization is not
		 enabled, or

	      ·	 The privilege is a root replacement privilege, effective  uid
		 of  the process is zero, compartmentalization is enabled, and
		 the privilege is not a disallowed privilege in the  process's
		 compartment.

SYSTEM PRIVILEGE REQUIREMENTS
       This  section  provides	tables	that  list  the privileges that may be
       required where the corresponding man pages specifies "appropriate priv‐
       ileges"	to  perform certain operations or to operate in certain condi‐
       tions.  For each system call,  the  table  lists	 what  privileges  can
       potentially affect system call's behavior,

       The  subsections	 also  include	other functions and areas of interest.
       These tables list the privileges that may be required where  the	 indi‐
       vidual  man pages specifies "appropriate privileges" to perform certain
       operations or to operate in certain conditions.

       Several system calls are	 accessible  by	 privileged  and  unprivileged
       applications.  For example, the system call (see kill(2)), when used by
       a process without the privilege, can send a signal  only	 to  processes
       whose UIDs match the sending process' own UID.

       Some  general  guidelines apply to working with hardware-related system
       calls.

	      ·	 Many hardware devices need the privilege in addition  to  any
		 privileges needed by the specific system calls used.

	      ·	 Networking  and  streams  may	need  the and/or privileges in
		 addition to other  privileges,	 depending  on	what  you  are
		 attempting  to	 do.   For  example,  the command requires the
		 privilege (see exportfs(1M)).	The and library calls  require
		 the  privilege	 (possibly  in	addition to other privileges).
		 (See fdetach(3) and fattach(3C)).

   Privileges for the pstat System Call
       The system call typically needs the privilege when  operating  on  pro‐
       cesses  outside the calling process's compartment (see pstat(2)).  How‐
       ever, because this system call works in so  many	 areas,	 some  of  the
       functions  of this call may require other privileges.  The following is
       a list of those functions and the privileges they require:
	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

   Privileges for Security Containment
       Some commands related to Security Containment make use of certain priv‐
       ileges that are not used in other contexts:

	      PRIV_CHANGEFILEXSEC,	  PRIV_CMPTREAD,       PRIV_CMPTWRITE,
	      PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_RULESCONFIG

       Additionally, some library calls related to Security  Containment  make
       use of security specific privileges:
	      PRIV_CHANGECMPT

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_RULESCONFIG

	      PRIV_RULESCONFIG

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

   Privileges for System Calls
       The  following  table  lists  system  calls and the privileges they may
       need.  Some of these are dependent on what system object they are  act‐
       ing  on	(for  example, files in another compartment), the state of the
       system (for example, if the maximum  number  of	open  files  has  been
       reached), or other conditions.

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_ACCOUNTING

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,   PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	 PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_AUDCONTROL

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_NETPRIVPORT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CHOWN, PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CHROOT, PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_DEVOPS

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,  PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_LIMIT, PRIV_OBJSUID, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_EXEC

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_OBJSUID, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CHOWN, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_FORK, PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,   PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	 PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_OBJSUID, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_AUDCONTROL

	      PRIV_SYSNFS

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_FSINTEGRITY, PRIV_SYSATTR, PRIV_DEVOPS, PRIV_NETADMIN,
				       PRIV_NETPROMISCUOUS,  PRIV_NETRAWACCESS
				       and  more.   Generally  the  privileges
				       required for an depend  on  the	driver
				       and type of

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER, PRIV_REBOOT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,   PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	 PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_FSINTEGRITY

	      PRIV_LOCKRDONLY

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD,
				       PRIV_DACWRITE, PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,  PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_LIMIT,
				       PRIV_MKNOD

	      PRIV_MLOCK

	      PRIV_MLOCK

	      PRIV_DEVOPS or PRIV_RDEVOPS

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DLKM

	      PRIV_DLKM

	      PRIV_DLKM

	      PRIV_DLKM

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD,
				       PRIV_MOUNT or PRIV_FSMOUNT, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_MPCTL

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED,	  PRIV_DACREAD,	  PRIV_DACWRITE,   PRIV_LIMIT,
	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_MLOCK

	      PRIV_MLOCK

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_LIMIT, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,  PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_MLOCK

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_PSET, PRIV_RTPSET

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, [PRIV_OWNER]; see
				       for more information.

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_SYSATTR
				       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_REBOOT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,   PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	 PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,  PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER, PRIV_RTPRIO

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER, PRIV_RTSCHED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER, PRIV_RTSCHED

	      PCIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE, PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE, PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_SERIALIZE

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_SELFAUDIT

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_HOSTATTR

	      PRIV_AUDCONTROL

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_HOSTATTR

	      PRIV_SESSION

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_LIMIT, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_SESSION

	      PRIV_NETBROADCAST; varies depending on the option used.

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_CHSUBJIDENT

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACWRITE, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED,	 PRIV_COMMALLOWED,  PRIV_DACREAD,  PRIV_MLOCK,
	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_DACREAD

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_MOUNT	       or PRIV_SWAPCTL

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,  PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD,   PRIV_CMPTWRITE,	 PRIV_DACREAD,	PRIV_DACWRITE,
	      PRIV_OBJSUID,
				       PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_COMMALLOWED, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_LIMIT

	      PRIV_MOUNT or PRIV_FSMOUNT,
				       PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_CMPTREAD, PRIV_CMPTWRITE, PRIV_DACREAD, PRIV_DACWRITE,
				       PRIV_FSINTEGRITY, PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_SYSATTR	       or PRIV_CORESYSATTR

	      PRIV_OWNER

	      PRIV_MOUNT or PRIV_FSMOUNT

	      PRIV_LIMIT

WARNINGS
       Product documentation, as discussed  above,  describes  alternate  ways
       that  programs  or  users  can  obtain sufficient privileges to perform
       restricted operations.

   Network Issues
       Privileges are not propagated across  distributed  systems.   They  are
       applied	only on the local system.  For example, a process with or can‐
       not access a file on another system if it is necessary to override dis‐
       cretionary restrictions to do so.

       For  example,  if the system's NFS subsystem is configured to translate
       the user ID zero to the user ID it still does so.   Also,  some	system
       daemons	check to see if a connection originates from a privileged port
       (typically to determine whether to allow or deny the connection.	  This
       behavior is not and should not be altered.

   Privilege Escalation
       In certain situations, a single privilege or set of privileges can lead
       to a process gaining additional privileges  that	 were  not  explicitly
       granted.	 This is known as privilege escalation.

       For  example,  a	 user  with the privilege alone may overwrite critical
       operating system files and, in the process,  may	 grant	himself	 addi‐
       tional privileges beyond

SEE ALSO
       crontab(1),   sam(1M),	setfilexsec(1M),  setrules(1M),	 shutdown(1M),
       acct(2), audwrite(2), execve(2), getfh(2), mknod(2),  modload(2),  mod‐
       path(2),	 modstat(2),  mount(2), nice(2), setrlimit(2), priv_add_effec‐
       tive(3),	 priv_remove(3),  privileges(3),   compartments(4),   compart‐
       ments(5), privgrp(5), glossary(9).

								 privileges(5)
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