KAME_IPSEC(4) BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual KAME_IPSEC(4)NAME
ipsec — IP security protocol
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
options KAME_IPSEC
options IPSEC_ESP
options IPSEC_NAT_T
options IPSEC_DEBUG
DESCRIPTION
ipsec is the first implemtation of IPSEC in NetBSD. It is being replaced
by fast_ipsec(4).
The following kernel options are available:
options IPSEC
Includes support for the IPsec protocol. IPSEC will enable secret key
management part, policy management part, AH and IPComp. Kernel binary
will not be subject to export control in most of countries, even if com‐
piled with IPSEC. For example, it should be okay to export it from the
United States of America. INET6 and IPSEC are orthogonal so you can get
IPv4-only kernel with IPsec support, IPv4/v6 dual support kernel without
IPsec, and so forth. This option requires INET at this moment, but it
should not.
options IPSEC_DEBUG
Enables debugging code in IPsec stack. This option assumes IPSEC.
options IPSEC_ESP
Includes support for IPsec ESP protocol. IPSEC_ESP will enable source
code that is subject to export control in some countries (including the
United States), and compiled kernel binary will be subject to certain
restriction. This option assumes IPSEC.
options IPSEC_NAT_T
Includes support for IPsec Network Address Translator Traversal (NAT-T),
as described in RFCs 3947 and 3948. This feature might be patent-encum‐
bered in some countries. This option assumes IPSEC and IPSEC_ESP.
SEE ALSOioctl(2), socket(2), ipsec_set_policy(3), fast_ipsec(4), icmp6(4),
intro(4), ip6(4), ipsec(4), racoon(8), setkey(8), sysctl(8)STANDARDS
Daniel L. McDonald, Craig Metz, and Bao G. Phan, PF_KEY Key Management
API, Version 2, RFC, 2367.
HISTORY
The implementation described herein appeared in WIDE/KAME IPv6/IPsec
stack.
BUGS
The IPsec support is subject to change as the IPsec protocols develop.
There is no single standard for policy engine API, so the policy engine
API described herein is just for KAME implementation.
AH and tunnel mode encapsulation may not work as you might expect. If
you configure inbound “require” policy against AH tunnel or any IPsec
encapsulating policy with AH (like “esp/tunnel/A-B/use
ah/transport/A-B/require”), tunneled packets will be rejected. This is
because we enforce policy check on inner packet on reception, and AH
authenticates encapsulating (outer) packet, not the encapsulated (inner)
packet (so for the receiving kernel there's no sign of authenticity).
The issue will be solved when we revamp our policy engine to keep all the
packet decapsulation history.
Under certain condition, truncated result may be raised from the kernel
against SADB_DUMP and SADB_SPDDUMP operation on PF_KEY socket. This
occurs if there are too many database entries in the kernel and socket
buffer for the PF_KEY socket is insufficient. If you manipulate many
IPsec key/policy database entries, increase the size of socket buffer or
use sysctl(8) interface.
BSD January 16, 2012 BSD
