GSS_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT(3) Programmer's Manual GSS_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT(3)NAMEgss_init_sec_context — Initiate a security context with a peer applica‐
tion
SYNOPSIS
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
OM_uint32
gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, const gss_name_t target_name,
const gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
const gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec);
DESCRIPTION
Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application
and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter should be speci‐
fied either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc
object whose length field contains the value zero. The routine may
return a output_token which should be transferred to the peer applica‐
tion, where the peer application will present it to
gss_accept_sec_context(3). If no token need be sent,
gss_init_sec_context() will indicate this by setting the length field of
the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context establishment,
one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if
so, gss_init_sec_context() will return a status containing the supplemen‐
tary information bit GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. In this case,
gss_init_sec_context() should be called again when the reply token is
received from the peer application, passing the reply token to
gss_init_sec_context() via the input_token parameters.
Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and
return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited
for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke
gss_init_sec_context() within a loop:
int context_established = 0;
gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
...
input_token->length = 0;
while (!context_established) {
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
cred_hdl,
&context_hdl,
target_name,
desired_mech,
desired_services,
desired_time,
input_bindings,
input_token,
&actual_mech,
output_token,
&actual_services,
&actual_time);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
report_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
};
if (output_token->length != 0) {
send_token_to_peer(output_token);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token)
};
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
&context_hdl,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
break;
};
if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
receive_token_from_peer(input_token);
} else {
context_established = 1;
};
};
Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the fol‐
lowing restrictions apply to the output parameters:
· The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless the
accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit
GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be
applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value
returned via the actual_mech_type parameter is undefined until the
routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE.
· The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG,
GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and
GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the ret_flags parameter should con‐
tain the values that the implementation expects would be valid if
context establishment were to succeed. In particular, if the appli‐
cation has requested a service such as delegation or anonymous
authentication via the req_flags argument, and such a service is
unavailable from the underlying mechanism, gss_init_sec_context()
should generate a token that will not provide the service, and indi‐
cate via the ret_flags argument that the service will not be sup‐
ported. The application may choose to abort the context establish‐
ment by calling gss_delete_sec_context(3) (if it cannot continue in
the absence of the service), or it may choose to transmit the token
and continue context establishment (if the service was merely desired
but not mandatory).
· The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits
within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time
gss_init_sec_context() returns, whether or not the context is fully
established.
· GSS-API implementations that support per-message protection are
encouraged to set the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags
returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE sta‐
tus code). However, applications should not rely on this behavior as
the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the GSS-API. Instead,
applications should determine what per-message services are available
after a successful context establishment according to the
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values.
· All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero.
If the initial call of gss_init_sec_context() fails, the implementation
should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the
context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this. In
the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is per‐
mitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it
should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ), but the
preferred behavior is to leave the security context untouched for the
application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context(3) ).
During context establishment, the informational status bits
GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and GSS-
API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine
error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not exist in
version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that wish to run
over version 1 implementations must special-case these codes.
PARAMETERS
minor_status Mechanism specific status code.
initiator_cred_handle
handle for credentials claimed. Supply GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL
to act as a default initiator principal. If no default
initiator is defined, the function will return
GSS_S_NO_CRED.
context_handle
context handle for new context. Supply GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT
for first call; use value returned by first call in contin‐
uation calls. Resources associated with this context-han‐
dle must be released by the application after use with a
call to gss_delete_sec_context().
target_name Name of target
mech_type Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply GSS_C_NO_OID to
obtain an implementation specific default
req_flags Contains various independent flags, each of which requests
that the context support a specific service option. Sym‐
bolic names are provided for each flag, and the symbolic
names corresponding to the required flags should be logi‐
cally-ORed together to form the bit-mask value. The flags
are:
GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG
True Delegate credentials to remote peer
False Don't delegate
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG
True Request that remote peer authenticate itself
False Authenticate self to remote peer only
GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG
True Enable replay detection for messages protected
with gss_wrap(3) or gss_get_mic(3)
False Don't attempt to detect replayed messages
GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG
True Enable detection of out-of-sequence protected
messages
False Don't attempt to detect out-of-sequence messages
GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
True Request that confidentiality service be made
available (via gss_wrap(3))
False No per-message confidentiality service is
required.
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
True Request that integrity service be made available
(via gss_wrap(3) or gss_get_mic(3))
False No per-message integrity service is required.
GSS_C_ANON_FLAG
True Do not reveal the initiator's identity to the
acceptor.
False Authenticate normally.
time_req Desired number of seconds for which context should remain
valid. Supply 0 to request a default validity period.
input_chan_bindings
Application-specified bindings. Allows application to
securely bind channel identification information to the
security context. Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS if
channel bindings are not used.
input_token Token received from peer application. Supply
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or a pointer to a buffer containing the
value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER on initial call.
actual_mech_type
Actual mechanism used. The OID returned via this parameter
will be a pointer to static storage that should be treated
as read-only; In particular the application should not
attempt to free it. Specify NULL if not required.
output_token token to be sent to peer application. If the length field
of the returned buffer is zero, no token need be sent to
the peer application. Storage associated with this buffer
must be freed by the application after use with a call to
gss_release_buffer(3).
ret_flags Contains various independent flags, each of which indicates
that the context supports a specific service option. Spec‐
ify NULL if not required. Symbolic names are provided for
each flag, and the symbolic names corresponding to the
required flags should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags
value to test whether a given option is supported by the
context. The flags are:
GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG
True Credentials were delegated to the remote peer
False No credentials were delegated
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG
True The remote peer has authenticated itself.
False Remote peer has not authenticated itself.
GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG
True Replay of protected messages will be detected
False Replayed messages will not be detected
GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG
True Out-of-sequence protected messages will be
detected
False Out-of-sequence messages will not be detected
GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
True Confidentiality service may be invoked by call‐
ing gss_wrap(3) routine
False No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap(3))
available. gss_wrap(3) will provide message
encapsulation, data-origin authentication and
integrity services only.
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
True Integrity service may be invoked by calling
either gss_get_mic(3) or gss_wrap(3) routines.
False Per-message integrity service unavailable.
GSS_C_ANON_FLAG
True The initiator's identity has not been revealed,
and will not be revealed if any emitted token is
passed to the acceptor.
False The initiator's identity has been or will be
authenticated normally.
GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG
True Protection services (as specified by the states
of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
available for use if the accompanying major sta‐
tus return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED.
False Protection services (as specified by the states
of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
available only if the accompanying major status
return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE.
GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG
True The resultant security context may be trans‐
ferred to other processes via a call to
gss_export_sec_context().
False The security context is not transferable.
All other bits should be set to zero.
time_rec Number of seconds for which the context will remain valid.
If the implementation does not support context expiration,
the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify NULL
if not required.
RETURN VALUES
GSS_S_COMPLETE
Successful completion
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED
Indicates that a token from the peer application is
required to complete the context, and that
gss_init_sec_context must be called again with that token.
GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
Indicates that consistency checks performed on the
input_token failed
GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL
Indicates that consistency checks performed on the creden‐
tial failed.
GSS_S_NO_CRED
The supplied credentials were not valid for context initia‐
tion, or the credential handle did not reference any cre‐
dentials.
GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED
The referenced credentials have expired
GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS
The input_token contains different channel bindings to
those specified via the input_chan_bindings parameter
GSS_S_BAD_SIG
The input_token contains an invalid MIC, or a MIC that
could not be verified
GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN
The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error during
context establishment
GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN
The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a token
already processed. This is a fatal error during context
establishment.
GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT
Indicates that the supplied context handle did not refer to
a valid context
GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE
The provided target_name parameter contained an invalid or
unsupported type of name
GSS_S_BAD_NAME
The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed.
GSS_S_BAD_MECH
The specified mechanism is not supported by the provided
credential, or is unrecognized by the implementation.
SEE ALSOgss_accept_sec_context(3), gss_delete_sec_context(3), gss_get_mic(3),
gss_release_buffer(3), gss_wrap(3)STANDARDS
RFC 2743 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Ver‐
sion 2, Update 1
RFC 2744 Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings
HISTORY
The gss_init_sec_context function first appeared in FreeBSD 7.0.
AUTHORS
John Wray, Iris Associates
COPYRIGHT
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to oth‐
ers, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or
assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and dis‐
tributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided
that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all
such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not
be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or ref‐
erences to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except
as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case
the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process
must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT‐
NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
BSD January 26, 2010 BSD
