SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3) OpenSSL SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3)NAME
SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth - set peer
certificate verification parameters
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth);
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
DESCRIPTIONSSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ctx to
be mode and specifies the verify_callback function to be
used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL
pointer can be used for verify_callback.
SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ssl to be
mode and specifies the verify_callback function to be used.
If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer
can be used for verify_callback. In this case last
verify_callback set specifically for this ssl remains. If no
special callback was set before, the default callback for
the underlying ctx is used, that was valid at the time ssl
was created with SSL_new(3).
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the
certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for
ctx. (See the BUGS section.)
SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the certi-
ficate chain verification that shall be allowed for ssl.
(See the BUGS section.)
NOTES
The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set
of logically or'ed mode flags:
SSL_VERIFY_NONE
Server mode: the server will not send a client certifi-
cate request to the client, so the client will not send
a certificate.
Client mode: if not using an anonymous cipher (by
default disabled), the server will send a certificate
which will be checked. The result of the certificate
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SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3) OpenSSL SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3)
verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL
handshake using the SSL_get_verify_result(3) function.
The handshake will be continued regardless of the verif-
ication result.
SSL_VERIFY_PEER
Server mode: the server sends a client certificate
request to the client. The certificate returned (if any)
is checked. If the verification process fails, the
TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an
alert message containing the reason for the verification
failure. The behaviour can be controlled by the addi-
tional SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT and
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE flags.
Client mode: the server certificate is verified. If the
verification process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
immediately terminated with an alert message containing
the reason for the verification failure. If no server
certificate is sent, because an anonymous cipher is
used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
Server mode: if the client did not return a certificate,
the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with a
"handshake failure" alert. This flag must be used
together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
Client mode: ignored
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
Server mode: only request a client certificate on the
initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client cer-
tificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag
must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
Client mode: ignored
Exactly one of the mode flags SSL_VERIFY_NONE and
SSL_VERIFY_PEER must be set at any time.
The actual verification procedure is performed either using
the built-in verification procedure or using another appli-
cation provided verification function set with
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3). The following descrip-
tions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An appli-
cation provided procedure also has access to the verify
depth information and the verify_callback() function, but
the way this information is used may be different.
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set
the limit up to which depth certificates in a chain are used
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SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3) OpenSSL SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3)
during the verification procedure. If the certificate chain
is longer than allowed, the certificates above the limit are
ignored. Error messages are generated as if these certifi-
cates would not be present, most likely a
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY will be issued.
The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA
certificate", "level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so
on. Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1,
and 2. The default depth limit is 9, allowing for the peer
certificate and additional 9 CA certificates.
The verify_callback function is used to control the
behaviour when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be
supplied by the application and receives two arguments:
preverify_ok indicates, whether the verification of the cer-
tificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
(preverify_ok=0). x509_ctx is a pointer to the complete con-
text used for the certificate chain verification.
The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest
nesting level (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to
the peer's certificate. At each level signatures and issuer
attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is
found, the error number is stored in x509_ctx and
verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=0. By applying
X509_CTX_store_* functions verify_callback can locate the
certificate in question and perform additional steps (see
EXAMPLES). If no error is found for a certificate,
verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=1 before advanc-
ing to the next level.
The return value of verify_callback controls the strategy of
the further verification process. If verify_callback returns
0, the verification process is immediately stopped with
"verification failed" state. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a
verification failure alert is sent to the peer and the
TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If verify_callback returns
1, the verification process is continued. If verify_callback
always returns 1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be ter-
minated with respect to verification failures and the con-
nection will be established. The calling process can however
retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
SSL_get_verify_result(3) or by maintaining its own error
storage managed by verify_callback.
If no verify_callback is specified, the default callback
will be used. Its return value is identical to preverify_ok,
so that any verification failure will lead to a termination
of the TLS/SSL handshake with an alert message, if
SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
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SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3) OpenSSL SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3)BUGS
In client mode, it is not checked whether the
SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set, but whether SSL_VERIFY_NONE is
not set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour, if the
SSL_VERIFY_PEER and SSL_VERIFY_NONE are not used as required
(exactly one must be set at any time).
The certificate verification depth set with
SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth() stops the verification at a certain
depth. The error message produced will be that of an incom-
plete certificate chain and not
X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected.
RETURN VALUES
The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic
information.
EXAMPLES
The following code sequence realizes an example
verify_callback function that will always continue the
TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if
wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit
with more informational output.
All verification errors are printed, informations about the
certificate chain are printed on request. The example is
realized for a server that does allow but not require client
certificates.
The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store
application data into/retrieve application data from the SSL
structure (see SSL_get_ex_new_index(3),
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)).
...
typedef struct {
int verbose_mode;
int verify_depth;
int always_continue;
} mydata_t;
int mydata_index;
...
static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err, depth;
SSL *ssl;
mydata_t *mydata;
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err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
/*
* Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
* and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
*/
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
/*
* Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
* SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
* that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
* have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
* We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
* be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
* additional certificates would be logged.
*/
if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
preverify_ok = 0;
err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
}
if (!preverify_ok) {
printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
}
else if (mydata->verbose_mode)
{
printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
}
/*
* At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
* it for something special
*/
if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT))
{
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
}
if (mydata->always_continue)
return 1;
else
return preverify_ok;
}
...
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mydata_t mydata;
...
mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
...
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
verify_callback);
/*
* Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
* an appropriate error in the logfile.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
/*
* Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
* structure.
*/
mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
...
SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */
if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
{
/* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
}
}
SEE ALSOssl(3), SSL_new(3), SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3),
SSL_get_verify_result(3), SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3),
SSL_get_peer_certificate(3),
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3),
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3),
SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)MirOS BSD #10-current 2005-02-05 6
